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The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of
Undocumented Immigrants: On Guitterez and
the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel
Victor C. Romero*
Introduction
American history might suggest that our affection towards immi-
grants waxes and wanes like everything else,' but the current anti-
immigrant backlash has seen unprecedented attacks on immigrants'
rights.2 Through California's Proposition 187, 3 the denial of welfare
benefits to certain classes of legal permanent residents, 4 and the curtail-
" Associate Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of
Law; e-mail: vcrl@psu.edu. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Immi-
gration Law Workshop held at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law,
May 28-30, 1998. I would like to thank Alex Aleinikoff for his insightful comments as the
moderator of the panel presentation, as well as Lenni Benson, Linda Bosniak, Kevin John-
son, John Scanlan, and Margaret Taylor for their useful remarks after the presentation. I
also greatly appreciate the helpful advice of Harvey Feldman, Kevin Johnson, Steve Le-
gomsky, and Michael Mogill, all of whom read a full draft of this piece. Of course, all
errors that remain are mine. Thanks as well to Jeff Wong for his careful work drafting the
appendix, and to Bill Dorgan, Jeff Wong, and Amy Phillips for their excellent research
assistance. Most of all, I would like to thank my wife, Corie, and my family in the Philip-
pines, for their untiring love and support.
I See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just
Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. Rv. 615 (1981) (describing the cyclical nature
of U.S. citizens' affection towards Mexicans and Mexican immigration).2See, e.g., IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IM-
PULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan Perea ed., 1997) [hereinafter IMMIGRANTS OUT!]
(containing several essays describing the current anti-immigrant backlash in the United
States).
3 See generally Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California's Proposition 187-Does It Mean
What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 577 (1996); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular
Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrele-
vance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629, 651 (1995) ("It is also possible that the passage of
Proposition 187 resulted from sheer frustration with immigration!'). In 1998, U.S. District
Judge Mariana Pfaelzer declared the 1994 California ballot initiative constitutionally
infirm. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3418
(C.D. Cal. March 13, 1998). California Governor Gray Davis has agreed not to appeal
Judge Pfaelzer's ruling. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling,
Ending Court Battles; Litigation: Governor's Deal with Civil Rights Groups Effectively
Kills 1994 Anti-Illegal Immigrant Measure. Accord Is Likely to Ignite Further Controversy,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at Al. Meanwhile, an organization called Save Our State plans
to submit a revised version of Proposition 187 for the November 2000 California ballot.
SaveOurState (visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.saveourstate.org/home.html>.
4 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
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ment of judicial review of certain administrative decisions under both the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") 5 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA"),6 states and the federal government have deprived im-
migrants of rights many citizens take for granted. As immigration schol-
ars have long argued, many of these limiting pronouncements may be a
function of the plenary power doctrine that privileges citizen status over
personhood.7 The result is that the law denies noncitizens many of the
basic personal rights that are allocated based on membership in the
United States polity.8 Although it is unlikely that the United States, or
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). See generally Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My
Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L.
REv. 1587 (1997); Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictions on Public Benefits: The
Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1245 (Sept. 23, 1996). Fortu-
nately, President Clinton is currently moving towards restoring many of the benefits to
noncitizens abrogated by the welfare "reform" bill. See Michael Janofsky, Legal Immi-
grants Would Regain Aid in President's Plan, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 25, 1999, at Al.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).6 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). Both AEDPA and IIRIRA deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to decide certain
immigration decisions. For example, section 306(a) of the IIRIRA strips federal courts ofjurisdiction over noncitizens' claims arising out of proceedings brought by the Attorney
General. See IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp. II 1996)). For an analysis of the
constitutionality of IIRIRA's "court stripping" provision, see Lenni B. Benson, Back to the
Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29
CONN. L. REv. 1411 (1997); see also Victor C. Romero, Expanding the Circle of Member-
ship by Reconstructing the "Alien": Lessons from Social Psychology and the "Promise
Enforcement" Cases, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1998) (calling for the repeal of the court
stripping provisions of IIRIRA based on a review of social psychology research on nega-
tive noncitizen stereotypes). For a general discussion of AEDPA and IIRIRA, see Sympo-
sium, The Impact of the 1996 Immigration Legislation, 11 GEo. IMMIR. L.J. 265 (1997).
7 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT.
REv. 255; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Con-
gress and the Courts, 22 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory In-
terpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Im-
migration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLum.
L. Rav. 1625 (1992); Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking
Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 76 OR. L. REv. 425 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigra-
tion Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1984); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished
Golden Door, 1993 Wisc. L. REv. 965 (1996); Frank Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moder-
ate Proposalfor Immigration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 35 (1996).
8 For example, while the Supreme Court has declared that the right to vote is funda-
mental, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969), the Constitu-
tion does not require noncitizen suffrage. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMI-
GRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 572 (4th ed. 1998). Nonetheless, some
commentators have argued that noncitizens should be allowed to vote. See Jamin B.
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens
and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
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any other country for that matter, will abolish the citizen/noncitizen dis-
tinction, 9 a system that favors citizens' rights claims over those of non-
citizens must include sufficient protections for personal rights.10
While the denial of public benefits to legal permanent residents
might define one end of the debate,' this Article chooses to take up the
other extreme: the possible denial of a basic constitutional right to so-
called illegal aliens, or, less pejoratively, undocumented immigrants. 2 In
particular, this Article provides a model for striking a better balance be-
tween the treatment of citizen and noncitizen Fourth Amendment claims.
The model draws an analogy between the landowner/entrant classification
9 The European Community members would be the exceptions to this statement be-
cause, under the Treaty on European Union, these nations have begun to experiment with a
single immigration policy to govern interstate movement of union citizens within the
community. See Giovanna I. Wolf, Efforts Toward "An Ever Closer" European Union
Confront Immigration Barriers, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (1996). Still, this is
not the equivalent of a borderless continent. For more on the open border debate, see, for
example, ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM
OF MOVEMENT (1987); OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL
ISSUES (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for
Open Borders, 49 REv. PoL. 251 (1987); R. George Wright, Federal Immigration Law and
the Case for Open Entry, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1265 (1994).
10 At one extreme, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would condone the
torture of noncitizen defendants in criminal cases in order to extort confessions from them.
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (holding that government
agents may not beat confessions out of defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment). At
the opposite extreme, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would enfranchise
noncitizens, given the concern with maintaining the value of citizenship. But cf. sources
cited supra note 8. Thus, this Article seeks to contribute to the legal literature exploring
the appropriate level of protection for noncitizens' personal rights claims within the con-
text of an American constitutional law that distributes rights based on degrees of polity
membership. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9, 10 (1990) ("Immigration policy, conceived of as
membership rules, is thought to lie at the core of national self-determination and self-
definition."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in IMMI-
GRANTS OUT!, supra note 2 at 324, 324-31 (arguing that denial of public benefits to per-
manent residents sends the message that the circle of citizenship is growing ever smaller);
Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1047 (1994); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the Na-
tional Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165 (1983); Michael
Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IowA L.
REV. 707 (1996).
"See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Alienage Classifications in a Nation of Immigrants:
Three Models of "Permanent" Residence in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 199, 199-223 (Noah Pickus ed., 1998).
121 prefer the terms "noncitizen" and "undocumented immigrant" to "alien" and "ille-
gal alien:' respectively, because of the pejorative connotations attached to the word "alien."
However, I prefer the phrase "alienage jurisprudence" to "citizenship jurisprudence" be-
cause the former captures the dehumanizing nature of such categorizations. See Romero,
supra note 7, at 455-56 n.4; Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransom-
ing the Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 573, 573 n.4
(1997); see also Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Law: The Social
and Legal Construction on Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268'(1996-
97) (discussing "how the term alien masks the privilege of citizenship and helps to justify
the status quo").
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scheme in premises liability law and the noncitizenship classifications in
immigration law. Its goal is to show how immigration theorists can learn
from states that have abandoned the traditional premises liability classifi-
cations in favor of a unitary "reasonable person" tort law standard. This
abandonment reflects the belief that the traditional premises liability
classifications dehumanize the injured party. Similarly, this Article con-
tends that recent immigrants' rights law developments devalue nonciti-
zens by depriving them of certain basic personal rights granted to citi-
zens. Furthermore, the Article concludes that the denial of noncitizens'
Fourth Amendment rights would be contrary to the Amendment's pri-
mary purpose of deterring unlawful government conduct.
Although the scope of Fourth Amendment rights for undocumented
immigrants has been the subject of debate in the literature, 3 two recent
decisions in United States v. Guitterez highlight the need for a reexami-
nation of the issue.14 In October 1997, in her initial decision in United
States v. Guitterez [hereinafter Guitterez 1], U.S. District Judge Saundra
Brown Armstrong held that criminal defendant and undocumented immi-
grant Javier Guitterez could not invoke the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence because the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreason-
able searches and seizures did not apply to him.'5 Citing dicta from the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'6
and the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Barona,17 the trial
court ruled that Guitterez had not established a "significant voluntary
connection" with the United States to grant him standing to assert any
13 See, e.g., James G. Connell, III & Rene L. Valladares, Search and Seizure Protec-
tions for Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in
Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. CRiM. L. RIv. 1293 (1997); Michael Scaperlanda, The
Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do They Survive United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 Mo. L. Rv. 213 (1991); Victor C. Romero, Note, What-
ever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 999 (1992).
14No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997)
[hereinafter Guitterez 1], vacated, 983 F Supp. 905 (N.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Guitterez
11]. These decisions have received little scholarly attention thus far, and have been rele-
gated to the footnotes of a few articles. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The
Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 192 n.50 (1998);
Liliana M. Garces, Note, Evolving Notions of Membership: The Significance of Communal
Yies in Alienage Jurisprudence, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1069 n.153 (1998); Jonathan L.
Hafetz, Note, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19
WHITTIER L. REv. 843, 868 n.170 (1998). Notably, the second Guitterez decision has been
cited in a prominent treatise on federal civil practice in the treatise's discussion of stand-
ing. See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 674 (1999).
15 See Guitterez I, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *22-23. The holding in Guitterez I is re-
markable given that the Supreme Court, while forbidding the use of the exclusionary rule
in deportation proceedings, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984), im-
plicitly allowed for the rule's use in criminal proceedings by distinguishing the two ac-
tions. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038-39.
16 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
17 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Fourth Amendment right against the U.S. government.18 Fortunately, in
January 1998, in a second United States v. Guitterez opinion [hereinafter
Guitterez II], Judge Armstrong reversed herself sua sponte, holding that
neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had given any guidance
as to whether and how the significant voluntary connection test should
apply. 9 Given this lack of appellate court directive, the district court de-
18 Guitterez 1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *16 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
271). This language in Verdugo-Urquidez was cited favorably by the Ninth Circuit in Bar-
ona, 56 F.3d at 1093.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez has drawn much ire from the
legal academy for its creation of a test requiring that undocumented immigrants prove their
significant voluntary connections to the United States before they can avail themselves of
Fourth Amendment protection. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 ("'[Tlhe people'
protected by the Fourth Amendment... refers to a class of persons who are part of a na-
tional community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country
to be considered part of that community.").
For criticism of Rehnquist's Verdugo-Urquidez opinion, see, for example, GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW 103-17 (1996); Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's
"Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L. L. 151 (1991); Andreas F Lowen-
feld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1990); Jon A. Dobson, Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: A Move Away
from Belief in the Universal Pre-existing Rights of All People, 36 S.D. L. REv. 120 (1991);
Gail T. Kikawa, Note, Verdugo-Urquidez: How the Majority Stumbled, 13 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 369 (1991); Janet E. Mitchell, Note, The Selective Application of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 289 (1991); Mary Lynn Nicholas, Note, United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
267 (1990-91); Romero, supra note 13, at 999.
Eric Bentley suggests that Rehnquist may have based his approach on earlier writings
by Professor Paul B. Stephan III supporting greater restrictions on noncitizens' rights
claims in an effort to curb international terrorism. See Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an Inter-
national Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-
Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329, 346 n.68 (1994) (citing Paul B. Stephan III,
Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L.
777 (1980); Paul B. Stephan I, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against Interna-
tional Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. Rav. 831 (1987)
("Two earlier articles by Professor Stephan appear to have provided some of the theoretical
underpinning for the Chief Justice's opinion, and were cited by the Justice Department in
its briefs:')).
19 983 F. Supp. 905, 916 (N.D. Cal. 1998). In commenting on an earlier draft of this
paper at the 1998 Immigration Law Workshop, Alex Aleinikoff contended that the Guit-
terez problem might not be as significant as the author asserts. Discussion with T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, in Berkeley, Cal.
(May, 1998). Specifically, Aleinikoff saw current Fourth Amendment law as protecting the
rights of undocumented immigrants in this country and therefore saw Guitterez I as an
aberrant decision that was corrected by the Court in Guitterez II. See id. While Aleinikoff
might have been right about the current state of the law, recent cases suggest that the result
in Guitterez I might be repeated in other jurisdictions. In Torres v. State, for example, the
Texas Court of Appeals cited Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Verdugo-Urquidez, and held that
the undocumented immigrant defendant in that case had no standing to contest the search
and seizure of contraband from his car because he had not developed sufficient connections
with the United States. Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Although it is also dicta,
Barona's strong statement that undocumented immigrants may not always have standing to
claim Fourth Amendment protections remains a powerful tool for the government to argue
against the conferral of fundamental rights to a whole class of people. See Barona, 56 F.3d
20001
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cided to proceed on the presumption that undocumented immigrants had
standing to assert Fourth Amendment claims, and then adjudicated Guit-
terez's motion on its merits.20
While the welfare benefits cases are troublesome because they repre-
sent the denial of economic support to those on the verge of becoming
citizens, the Guitterez case is even more disturbing. Had Guitterez I not
been vacated, the Fourth Amendment would not have provided even
minimal protection to undocumented immigrants. Put differently, the is-
sue of "welfare reform" as it affects legal permanent residents is about
establishing a ceiling of immigrant benefits, while the issue of Fourth
Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants should be about creating
a floor of rights, beneath which the United States government may not
fall. Guitterez I nearly dissolves any possible Fourth Amendment floor
for undocumented immigrants by breathing life into Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit dicta that condition the right to be free from unreasonable
government intrusion on a person's legal connections to the United
States.21 In effect, such an approach would make citizenship status a pre-
requisite for asserting Fourth Amendment rights. If the Guitterez I ap-
proach is followed elsewhere, it could lead to the erosion of Fourth
Amendment rights for not only undocumented immigrants but, arguably,
for legal nonimmigrants as well. For example, if the ideas in Guitterez I
were to gain support, tourists and international students accused of
crimes could be required to show significant voluntary connections with
the United States before they could avail themselves of Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees.
This possible collapse of the Fourth Amendment floor for undocu-
mented immigrants can be viewed from a Fourth Amendment perspective
or from an immigrants' rights perspective. As to the former approach,
one might conclude that the result in Guitterez I was a symptom of the
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights in U.S. society generally, and there-
fore not a product of discrimination against noncitizens. This Article
at 1087. Perhaps most importantly, decisions in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998)
(upholding constitutionality of Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provision, 8
U.S.C. § 1409 (a) (4) (1988), denying citizenship to Filipina whose American father failed
to file a timely paternity claim), and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit-
tee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that selective prosecution claim may not be raised as
defense to deportation), suggest a climate in which the substantial connections test has a
good chance of being upheld if adopted by the lower federal courts.
20 See Guitterez II, 983 F. Supp. at 905.
21Stephen Legomsky notes that although the undocumented immigrant might be able
to pursue a civil Bivens action, this would be difficult in practice given, among other
things, a high likelihood that the person would be deported following conviction. See E-
mail from Stephen Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law (Mar. 30,
1999) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review). See also INA
§ 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1999) (describing classes of deportable criminal nonciti-
zens).
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leaves that analysis to those better versed in the Fourth Amendment. 22
Instead, this piece explores the phenomenon in the context of the rights
of undocumented immigrants. Specifically, it examines whether immi-
gration law's adherence to immigration classifications as the primary ba-
sis for determining noncitizen entitlements in the United States might
have contributed to the near-collapse of the Fourth Amendment floor in
the Guitterez decisions. In other words, could the classification of a de-
fendant as an "illegal alien" become an acceptable reason for denying her
Fourth Amendment rights in the near future, and, if so, is there a better
way of ensuring the solidity of the hypothetical constitutional floor? This
Article proposes the following solution: when the Fourth Amendment is
at issue in a case, courts should give less significance to the immigration
status of the noncitizen and instead should focus on how the right should
apply in the individual case, taking the immigration status of the nonciti-
zen as one factor among many. In reestablishing a floor of Fourth
Amendment rights, such a scheme would have two salutary effects: first,
it would reaffirm the idea that, in applying criminal constitutional rights,
the personhood of noncitizens should carry more weight than their non-
membership in the U.S. polity;23 second; it would reemphasize the pur-
pose of criminal constitutional rights by correctly focusing on deterring
unconstitutional government conduct rather than determining whether
rights extend to some individuals but not to others.
To make its case, this Article looks to domestic tort law and the rules
that govern a landowner's liability in tort for injuries to entrants upon her
land.' Although many states retain the traditional entrant classification
22 This Article discusses briefly the importance of the Fourth Amendment in Part Im.C.
Because much has been written about the origins of the Fourth Amendment safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures, this Article will recap only the significant parts
of that history to discern the purposes of the Amendment, leaving the interested reader to
explore the greater part of that history elsewhere. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996 & Supp.
1998); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY
IN CONSITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
2 This Article addresses undocumented immigrants' Fourth Amendment rights, leav-
ing aside the question of what other constitutional rights should be accorded undocu-
mented immigrants specifically or noncitizens generally. Note, however, that the Supreme
Court has held that various constitutional amendments protect noncitizens in different
contexts. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that state statute denying
public education to undocumented immigrant children was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (stating that a
legal permanent resident is a "person" for Fifth Amendment purposes); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deciding that legal permanent residents have First Amendment
rights). Indeed, Stephen Legomsky has argued that the citizen/noncitizen distinction should
be reserved for international issues but should be abolished with respect to domestic legis-
lation. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994).
2 The tort law/immigration law analogy set forth here is a variation on and expansion
of ideas set forth by Peter Reich and Peter Schuck in earlier law review articles. See Peter
L. Reich, Jurisprudential Tradition and Undocumented Alien Entitlements, 6 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1 (1992); Schuck, supra note 7. Unlike these earlier pieces, however, this Article fully
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system25 for assessing tort duties in premises liability cases, states such
as California and New York have abolished the tripartite trespasser, li-
censee, and invitee classes in favor of a due care standard. Immigration
scholars could look to these states as models for rethinking ways to se-
cure the domestic Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immi-
grants. States that adhere to the general due care or reasonableness stan-
dard recognize the equal personhood of all injured entrants regardless of
status, and limit landowner liability on foreseeability grounds. In such
states, an entrant's status might be a factor affecting the foreseeability
analysis, but it is not a factor that may foreclose liability. In contrast, in
traditional entrant classification states, the entrant's status limits land-
owner liability at the outset, thereby privileging the entrant's status over
her personhood.
The traditional entrant classification scheme is analogous to current
U.S. immigration and immigrants' rights policy because both are based
on classification systems that deny relief to certain persons based on their
legal status. A reasonableness standard for premises liability, however,
values the equal personhood of all entrants and provides an arguably
more-balanced approach to thinking about the citizen/noncitizen distinc-
tion.
This Article contends that immigration scholars should look to the
reasonableness standard to solve the Guitterez I problem that threatens a
collapse of the Fourth Amendment floor of undocumented immigrants'
rights. Instead of relying on the defendant's status as an "illegal alien" to
determine whether she is entitled to Fourth Amendment rights, courts
should focus on the right to be free from unreasonable governmental in-
trusion, much in the same way that the Supreme Court of California, in
Rowland v. Christian, emphasized the right to be compensated for physi-
cal harm.26 Such a paradigm shift would ensure that the floor of Fourth
Amendment rights for non-citizens remains intact.
This Article is composed of three parts. Part I examines the prob-
lems raised by the Guitterez I regime, including the collapse of the pro-
tective constitutional floor of immigrants' rights portended by that deci-
sion. Part H contends that the current plenary power approach to immi-
gration and immigrants' rights issues would likely support, rather than
expounds upon the tort law/immigration law analogy and applies it to a specific problem:
the potential erosion of domestic Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants.
At least one other commentator has drawn a similar analogy between property law and
immigration law. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 120 (2d ed. 1997).
25The traditional system measures the landowner's duties depending on whether the
injured plaintiff is a trespasser, licensee, or invitee upon the land. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
2 443 P.2d 561, 564-65, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that plaintiff's right to be compen-
sated was not determined solely by his entrant status but rather by whether the defendant
acted reasonably).
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dismantle, the Guitterez I approach to undocumented immigrants' Fourth
Amendment rights. Part III provides an alternative to the plenary power
regime by drawing a parallel between domestic tort law for premises li-
ability and immigrants' rights law. This part concludes by showing that
Rowland and its progeny could serve as the proper basis for rebuilding
the floor of constitutional protection for immigrants charged with violat-
ing U.S. law.
I. The Problem: The Guitterez IlBarona Approach to Undocumented
Immigrants' Fourth Amendment Rights
A. Shades of Barona and Verdugo-Urquidez: Applying the Significant
Voluntary Connections Test to the Domestic Search in Guitterez
Javier Guitterez is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico who
has lived in the United States since 1985.27 In June 1996, after a period of
surveillance,u the federal government filed a four-count indictment
charging Guitterez with various drug offenses29 and alleging him to be a
narcotics supplier in a large-scale cocaine distribution ring. 0
Following his indictment, Guitterez filed a motion to suppress in-
criminating evidence seized at a third party's residence and evidence ob-
tained by police at a traffic stop.3' Specifically, Guitterez contended that
the affidavit underlying the residential search was defective and that the
police had no probable cause to stop Guitterez's vehicle. 32
In response, the government argued that Guitterez had no standing to
object to any searches on Fourth Amendment grounds because he is an
undocumented immigrant. 33 In the alternative, the government argued,
even if the court found that Guitterez did have standing, the residential
search and traffic stop were legal on their merits.A4 •
In October 1997, District Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong issued
her ruling on Guitterez's motion in Guitterez L3 Judge Armstrong agreed
with the government's first argument and held that Guitterez could not
avail himself of any Fourth Amendment protections because he was an
27See United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997), at *17.
2 See id. at *2-7; United States v. Guitterez, 983 . Supp. 905, 908-10 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
29 See Guitterez II, 983 F. Supp. at 910.
30 See Guitterez I, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1.
3' See id. at *6.32 See id.
33 See id. at *7.
34 See id.
35 See id. at *1.
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undocumented immigrant who had not established "significant voluntary
connections" with the United States.36
The court began its analysis by looking to the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v. Barona37 and the U.S. Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez3 to determine the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections for undocumented immigrants.39
In Barona, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a Fourth Amendment challenge by
three noncitizens who claimed that they were wrongfully convicted on
various drug charges based in part on wiretap evidence obtained in Italy
and Denmark.40 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ver-
dugo-Urquidez involving a similar Fourth Amendment claim in the con-
text of a foreign search, the Barona court stated that the defendants first
had to establish that they were in the class of persons protected by the
Fourth Amendment before the court could rule on the merits of their ap-
peal. 41 In the end, the panel majority decided to bypass the standing is-
sue, opting to assume that the Fourth Amendment protected the defen-
dants, but concluding that their substantive claims were without merit.4 2
Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit avoided making a decision on
the standing issue, its discussion of standing is particularly interesting
because it closely tracks the discussion in Verdugo-Urquidez. To deter-
mine whether a noncitizen defendant may avail herself of the Fourth
Amendment's protections against foreign searches, the Barona court
followed Verdugo-Urquidez's lead and held that the noncitizen must es-
tablish a "voluntary connection" to the United States.4 3
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge brought by a Mexican citizen who was abducted from
Mexico and tried in the United States on drug charges. Verdugo-Urquidez
had attempted to suppress evidence obtained during a search of two of
his residences in Mexico." Reviewing the text of the Fourth Amendment,
361d. at *17-18. The Court specifically noted that it rejected the government's conten-
tion that all undocumented immigrants are per se barred from asserting Fourth Amendment
protections. See id. at *13 n.5. It held instead that an undocumented immigrant may be
protected under the Fourth Amendment if she has established "significant voluntary con-
nections" with the United States. See id. at *12. However, as discussed below, the Court's
application of the "significant voluntary connections" test to Guitterez's situation suggests
that an undocumented immigrant might never be able to develop significant voluntary con-
nections with the United States as long as her presence is viewed as "illegal," thereby ren-
dering her connections illegitimate for Fourth Amendment purposes. See discussion infra
Parts I.A, I.B.
37 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
38494 U.S. 259 (1990).39 See Guitterez 1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8.
40See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1089-90, 1093-94.
41 See id. at 1093-94.42 See id. at 1094.43 Id. at 1093.
44See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262-63. For a more complete discussion of this
case, see sources cited supra note 18.
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as well as relevant precedent, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to the search of Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican residences. 45
Although the six to three vote evidenced a strong agreement on the
judgment in the case, three of the justices in the majority penned separate
opinions. Even the most popular opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist outlined the rationale for when a noncitizen is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection, garnered only four votes. 46 Nonetheless,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion has been cited favorably by lower
courts, appearing in both Barona and Guitterez L 47
In defining the class protected by the Fourth Amendment,
Rehnquist's plurality opinion distinguished the text of the Fourth
Amendment, 48 which refers to "the right of the people," from the texts of
the Fifth49 and Sixth50 Amendments, which refer to a "person" and to "the
accused," respectively, in their protections against illegal government
45 See id. at 274-75.
4 See id. at 261 (showing breakdown of the vote and opinions filed). See also United
States v. Guitterez, 983 F.Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that a majority of jus-
tices did not agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's "substantial connection" test). See also
Scaperlanda, supra note 13, at 217-27 (analyzing each of the Verdugo-Urquidez Supreme
Court opinions).47 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1093-94; United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997), at *16-17.
48 The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
49 The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
50 The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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conduct.51 The opinion concluded that "the people" was a narrower term
of art than either "person" or "the accused." Rehnquist found that the
term "the people" was selectively used throughout the Constitution to
refer to "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community "'52
The Chief Justice drew a distinction here between Verdugo-
Urquidez, a Mexican national and resident,5 3 and the undocumented im-
migrant deportees in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza' In Lopez-Mendoza, the
Court ruled that the defendants could not avail themselves of the exclu-
sionary rule in the context of a deportation proceeding, implying that the
Fourth Amendment would be available to them in a criminal proceed-
ing.55 However, the plurality opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez argued that
"the [undocumented immigrants] in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United
States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obliga-
tions; but [Verdugo-Urquidez] had no voluntary connection with this
country that might place him among 'the people' of the United States "' 6
Next, reviewing the history of the Fourth Amendment, the Verdugo-
Urquidez plurality held that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to deter unreasonable conduct by the United States government
domestically, not extraterritorially. 57 Thus, because Verdugo-Urquidez's
residences were in Mexico, the plurality held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to them.58 Based on this textual and historical analysis, the
plurality decided that Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national, had not
established sufficient voluntary connections with the United States to bar
evidence obtained during searches of his Mexican residences.5 9
The Barona court adopted this test, even though Chief Justice
Rehnquist had not clearly defined what constitutes a "sufficient connec-
tion'" "significant voluntary connection," or "substantial connection" to
the United States (except to say that Verdugo-Urquidez did not meet the
test).6 However, in Barona, the Ninth Circuit avoided the problem of the
test's application by deciding the Fourth Amendment challenge on its
51 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
52 Id. Rehnquist noted that the term "people" appears in the Preamble and the First,
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. Id.53 Interestingly, Verdugo-Urquidez had a "green card," conferring upon him "legal
permanent resident" status in the United States. However, this fact did not even make its
way into the Supreme Court's opinion. See Romero, supra note 13, at 1013-14.
s 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).55 See id. at 1040-41.56 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272-73.5 7 See id. at 266-67.5 8 See id. at 274-75.
59 See id.
60 These different terms were used at various places within the majority opinion. Com-
pare "sufficient connection" with "significant voluntary connection" and "substantial con-
nection." Id. at 265, 271.
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merits. 61 In an interesting twist of fate, Chief Judge Wallace, who penned
the Barona majority opinion, had been a dissenter on the Ninth Circuit's
Verdugo-Urquidez panel, and his view in that case was ultimately
adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Verdugo-Urquidez plurality
decision. 62 Although his words were essentially dicta in Barona, Judge
Wallace cited his Ninth Circuit Verdugo-Urquidez dissent to provide two
examples of those whom he considered to be part of "the people" of the
United States for purposes of the Fourth Amendment: "'American citi-
zens at home and abroad' and lawful resident aliens within the borders of
the United States 'who are victims of actions taken in the United States
by American officials."' 63 Like Rehnquist in Verdugo-Urquidez, Wallace
did not define the boundaries of the substantial connection test, stating
only that there remained an open question as to whether a legal perma-
nent resident who had developed sufficient connections would be consid-
ered part of "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, even for
purposes of challenging foreign searches. 64
In citing Barona and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Guitterez I court might
have done well to follow Barona's lead and dodge the standing issue,
especially since Guitterez I dealt with a domestic search while Barona
and Verdugo-Urquidez both involved searches abroad. Because of this
crucial factual difference, the significant voluntary connections test an-
nounced in those cases amounted to little more than dicta, as the Guit-
terez I court acknowledged. 65 Nonetheless, the Guitterez I court chose to
apply a version of Rehnquist's "substantial connection" test from Ver-
dugo-Urquidez:
[A]n [undocumented] immigrant may invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment only if he or she demonstrates "a
61 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995).
62 This coincidence prompted Barona dissenting Judge Reinhardt to comment: "The
government here was simply fortunate enough to draw a panel led by the dissenter in Ver-
dugo and including another judge who agreed with his position'" Barona, 56 F.3d at 1105
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Reinhardt's observations led to this response by Wallace's co-
hort, Judge Tanner:
I concur in the opinion filed today. I write separately, however, to explicitly reject
Judge Reinhardt's inference that the makeup of the panel affected the outcome of
this case in any way other than in the normal course of the decision-making proc-
ess that goes into every case heard before this court. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
Id. at 1098 (Tanner, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).63 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214,
1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
64 Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1234.
5 See United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16446 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997), at *11 ("However, as the Ninth Circuit noted in [Barona],
the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether [undocumented immigrants] residing
within the United States are entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.").
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significant voluntary connection with the United States," The
salient issue in this case, therefore, is whether defendant Guit-
terez has developed substantial connections with this country by
voluntarily assuming the societal obligations imposed upon "the
people of the United States."'
The Guitterez I court applied this test by reviewing Guitterez's dec-
laration, which provided evidence of the following connections to the
United States, despite his undocumented status: (1) Guitterez had immi-
grated to the United States from Mexico in 1985; (2) he had been married
at the time to a legal permanent resident; (3) he had a child who was born
in the United States in 1993; (4) he had a California driver's license;
(5) he had received and paid for three traffic tickets; (6) he had lived in
California for more than ten years; and (7) he had paid sales and use
taxes on various items such as gas, food, clothing, and other goods nec-
essary to support himself and his family.67
The court rejected these various connections as insufficient, for five
reasons.68 First, Guitterez's twelve-year residence in the United States
and ten-year sojourn in California were nullified by the court because of
his illegal presence in the country.69 If anything, the court reasoned,
Guitterez's undocumented and undetected presence over a long period of
time suggested that he had not established sufficient connections to the
United States.70 Second, while Guitterez's family ties to a child and
spouse lawfully in the United States were voluntary, they were not
deemed significant absent a showing that entering into these relationships
constituted a choice to "'shoulder the burdens that [citizens] must
bear.' ' '71 Third, the court stated that none of Guitterez's proffered con-
nections established that he had "voluntarily accepted any significant
societal obligation while in the United States" 72 Specifically, the court
dismissed Guitterez's payment of sales and use taxes as mere compliance
with a general edict to pay incidental tariffs imposed on all individuals
6Id. at *16-*17 (citation omitted) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271).
67 See id. at *17-*18.
6See id. at *18.
69 See id.
70See id. at *18-*19.("Indeed, being able to reside in this country for a substantial pe-
riod of time without detection evidences that the defendant has not, in fact, established
significant connections to the national community.").
7' Id. at *19 (quoting United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1995)). In-
terestingly, the court never specified what it meant by "burdens that [citizens] must bear."
This language was lifted from Judge Wallace's Barona opinion, which he in turn lifted
from his own dissent in the Ninth Circuit's Verdugo-Urquidez decision. In his Verdugo-
Urquidez dissent, Judge Wallace used this language to summarize his reading of precedent
describing the relationship between the United States and noncitizens, and so he never
clearly defined this cryptic phrase. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214,
1236 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
72 Guitterez 1, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16446, at *19.
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who purchase goods and services in the United States.73 Fourth, Guit-
terez's California driver's license was deemed an insufficient connection
because he had failed to show that he had paid taxes or fees to the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, which would have indicated his contribution
to the maintenance and repair of state roads. 74 Fifth, the court minimized
Guitterez's payment of the three traffic tickets by stating that they paled
in comparison to his undocumented status and his alleged drug crimes. 75
With these five points, the Guitterez I court dismissed all of Guitterez's
connections to the United States, concluding that, because he had failed
to demonstrate a "significant voluntary connection" with the United
States, Guitterez could not "seek the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the instant case. 76
The district court revisited the issue of Guitterez's Fourth Amend-
ment standing three months later in Guitterez IIo77 In this latter opinion,
the district court had a change of heart with respect to the applicability of
the significant voluntary connections test. Re-reading both Barona and
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Guitterez II court decided that, given that the test
had appeared only in dicta as applied to a domestic search, it did not have
sufficient appellate guidance as to when or how to apply the test.78 Given
this uncertainty, the court decided to adhere to the existing presumption
that undocumented immigrants have standing to assert Fourth Amend-
ment violations.79 Adjudicating Guitterez's motion on its merits, the
Guitterez II court suppressed the evidence obtained during and after the
residential search, but not the evidence obtained during the traffic stop. 0
Decisions such as Guitterez I represent a danger to the basic right to
be free from unreasonable government searches and seizures. Part I.B of
this Article details why, despite the Guitterez court's ultimate restoration
of Fourth Amendment rights to the undocumented immigrant before it,immigration scholars should care about this danger. Specifically, Part I.B
shows how decisions like Guitterez I incorrectly decide when to confer
rights by focusing on degrees of connection to or membership in the
United States polity, rather than on the inherent right of all people to be
free from unreasonable government intrusion by virtue of their individual
personhood.
73 See id.
74 See id. at *20.
75 See id. at *21.
76 Id. at *21-22.
77 United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 910 (N.D. Cal. 1998).78 See id. at 916.
79 See id.
go See id. at 916-23.
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B. The Problem with the Significant Voluntary Connections Test
Although it was ultimately vacated, the Guitterez I decision essen-
tially created a per se rule with respect to undocumented immigrants'
Fourth Amendment rights: under the significant voluntary connections
test, an undocumented immigrant's illegal residence in the United States
vitiates any legitimate connections the person may have with this coun-
try. The five reasons offered by the Guitterez I court for rejecting the
significance of all of Guitterez's connections illuminate the court's real
basis for analysis: that Guitterez was an undocumented immigrant and,
therefore, could not have had a legitimate connection to the United
States.81 All of Guitterez's examples of significant voluntary connec-
tions-his family ties, his payment of taxes, his acquisition of a valid
driver's license-were negated by his undocumented presence in the
United States. 2 The court concludes as much in its summary:
At bottom, the Court finds that [Guitterez] has failed to demon-
strate that he has a "significant voluntary connection" with the
United States. There is no evidence that [Guitterez] has shoul-
dered the responsibilities of contributing, through taxes or oth-
erwise, to the health, education and welfare of the citizens of
this country-an obligation generally imposed on every other
lawful resident. At most, defendant has established that he has
been successful in avoiding detection by the immigration
authorities, thereby facilitating his residence in this country for
the past twelve years.83
At one level, the court's reasoning is appealing: undocumented im-
migrants should not be able to claim lengthy, well-established connec-
tions with the United States when they are not legally entitled to be in the
country in the first place. Thus, even though he might have been in this
country much longer than a tourist on vacation (who is legally present) in
the United States," Guitterez's length of stay was automatically nullified
as a factor because of his illegal presence in the country. Aside from en-
couraging compliance with the law generally, the Guitterez I holding
would have created a disincentive for noncitizens to immigrate to the
United States without the proper documentation. If a right as important
as the Fourth Amendment protection against searches and seizures could
be withheld from persons "illegally" present in the United States, then
81 See Guitterez I, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *21-22.
8 See id.
83 d. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
84Tourists typically need to apply for B-1 visitors' visas for entry into the United
States for a temporary period. INA § 101(a)(15)(B) (1998); see also LEooMsKY, supra note
24, at 273-74 (describing B-1 visitor status).
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such persons would have a strong interest in pursuing only legal means
of entry.
This analysis, however enticing, fails to persuade for two reasons.
First, whether one is legally or illegally in the United States is less an
issue of morality than an issue of public policy. Specifically, whether
one's status is legal or illegal upon arrival in the United States without a
visa may depend upon one's country of origin. For example, a temporary
business visitor from Canada may enter the United States without a valid
U.S. visa, while a Mexican national in the same situation may not.85
Thus, if both the Canadian and Mexican immigrants were to enter the
United States without visas, the Canadian immigrant would be deemed
legal while the Mexican immigrant would not. 6 In addition, the govern-
ment has, on occasion, granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants by
allowing them to apply for citizenship despite their illegal status. 7 When
it is politically expedient to do so, the government is willing to compro-
mise the rigid categorization of legal versus illegal aliens.88 Ultimately,
the Guitterez I court's strong presumption of the immorality of an un-
documented immigrant's stay in the United States makes little sense
given the sometimes blurry distinctions between legal and illegal pres-
ence in the United States.8 9
8 See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 341(a), Pub. L.
No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
96 Even after the successful passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in
1992, the United States still requires a visa or other immigration documentation from tem-
porary business visitors from Mexico but not from Canada. See Harry J. Joe, Temporary
Entry of Business Persons to the United States Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 399-400 (1994); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Free
Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 937 (1994); Gerald A. Wunsch, Why NAFTA's Immigration Provisions Dis-
criminate Against Mexican Nationals, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 127 (1994).
87 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986); see also MAURICE A. ROBERTS & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, UNDERSTANDING THE
1986 IMMIGRATION LAW (1987).
88 Indeed, the current INA, Pub. L. No. 10 1-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), provides for the cancellation of removal (previously,
deportation) of a permanent resident who has resided continuously in the United States,
whether or not the noncitizen has been in the country lawfully. Pursuant to INA
§ 240A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (b) (1990), removal can be cancelled if the resident alien
"has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in
any status .... "' Hence, a nonimmigrant who overstays her visa prior to adjusting her
status to legal permanent residence may arguably count the period of her unlawful resi-
dence in the United States towards the seven-year period as long as her stay was continu-
ous. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 24, at 473 (describing a hypothetical case). Thus, to the
extent that the immigration code specifically allows noncitizens to count their years of
unlawful presence to qualify for Section 240A relief, they should also be able to count
such unlawful presence in situations where Fourth Amendment standing is at stake.
89 One could argue that the amnesty provisions in the INA were simply temporary
measures to stem the tide of undocumented immigration and that generally speaking the
United States favors documented immigration. Moreover, one might contend that there is a
rational basis for requiring Mexican nationals to acquire visas, while not requiring Canadi-
ans to do the same, because many more Mexicans tend to stay longer than permissible.
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Second, and more significant, is the court's misguided reliance on
the significant voluntary connections test set forth in Verdugo-Urquidez
and Barona. Using the significant voluntary connections test to determine
Fourth Amendment standing incorrectly shifts the focus from the
Amendment's purpose of deterring unlawful government conduct (a pur-
pose the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez acknowledges) 0 to allo-
cating rights to individuals based on their relationship with the United
States. The significant voluntary connections test achieves this paradigm
shift, first, by highlighting the textual differences between "the people"
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the "person" or "the accused"
protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively.9' The test
then examines the bonds between the noncitizen and the United States as
a means of determining whether the Fourth Amendment protects the for-
eigner.Y' Although Rehnquist never specifically described the factors that
the trial court should review to determine whether one's ties are
"significant" and "voluntary," or "substantial," the Guitterez I court took
it upon itself to apply this indeterminate test. 93
Even more objectionable than its indeterminacy is the test's wrong-
headed approach towards Fourth Amendment law. The Supreme Court's
significant Fourth Amendment decisions tend to focus on whether a per-
son has a reasonable expectation of privacy or whether a search was con-
ducted reasonably, rather than on whether a certain individual or class of
individuals can claim Fourth Amendment protection in the first instance.
In standard cases, substantive Fourth Amendment claims turn not on the
identity of the person claiming protection, but on the sufficiency of that
person's privacy interest in the place searched. 94 Thus, by creating an ob-
While the second argument might justify the reason for the different treatment, the first
argument regarding amnesty certainly undercuts the idea that amnesty policies are based
on morality rather than practicality.
90 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
911d. at 265-66.
92 See id. at 271 ("[Noncitizens] receive constitutional protections when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with
this country.").
93 United States v. Guitterez, No. 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at
*16-17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997).
9 "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection:' Katz v. United States, 387 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); see also CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 113 (2d ed. 1986) ("The Fourth Amendment only protects 'reasonable expectations
of privacy' from government intrusion").
Scott Sundby notes that many modern Fourth Amendment cases involve balancing the
interests of the government in law enforcement and the individual's privacy interests, often
to the detriment of the individual. See Scott Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment:
Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751,
1764 & n.44 (1994). However, these cases also presume that the individual has a Fourth
Amendment right to assert, which differs from the Guitterez IlBarona approach, under
which the undocumented immigrant must first prove that she is entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection before the balancing of competing interests applies. Some might argue that
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stacle to standing in the guise of the significant voluntary connections
test for a select group of persons, Guitterez I, Barona, and Verdugo-
Urquidez erode the Fourth Amendment's objective of deterring unreason-
able government conduct.
Because the Fourth Amendment would protect only some individu-
als under the Guitterez IlBarona approach, it would create an incentive
for government to be more intrusive in its efforts to investigate undocu-
mented immigrants, and possibly documented nonimmigrants, accused of
criminal activity. Suppose, for example, that the leadership of a suspected
drug ring is composed of three Europeans-one legal permanent resident,
one temporary nonimmigrant holding a valid college student visa, and
one undocumented immigrant-and that all three have been arrested on
the basis of evidence uncovered during an illegal search of their joint
business office. Under the Guiterrez I analysis, each defendant's ability
to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge would vary depending upon her
immigration status. Presumably, the legal permanent resident would have
no problem asserting her right to be free from an unreasonable search
because she would be able to demonstrate her significant voluntary con-
nections to the United States-her legitimate business interests, her long
time legal residence in the United States, and so forth.95 The undocu-
mented immigrant would likely be unable to claim standing because any
legitimate connections would be negated by her undocumented status.
9 6
the Supreme Court's focus on how the Fourth Amendment applies rather than whether it
applies to protect a defendant stems from the fact that most Fourth Amendment cases in-
volve citizens, thereby obviating the need for the Court to determine whether the provision
applies to noncitizens. However, prior to Rehnquist's pronouncements in Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Court had long assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to noncitizens.
See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). Indeed, this is precisely why
Rehnquist's Verdugo-Urquidez opinion is so troubling: because he gave credence to the
"significant voluntary connections" test, Rehnquist created an opportunity for lesser tribu-
nals such as the Guitterez I court to deny undocumented immigrants Fourth Amendment
rights by ruling that their foreign status precludes courts from reaching a decision on the
merits of their constitutional claim.
95 Of course, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the defen-
dant's status was one of legal permanent residence and yet he was denied Fourth Amend-
ment protection. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. However, Verdugo-Urquidez
involved an extraterritorial search. See 494 U.S. at 259. Eric Bentley suggests that the
Rehnquist plurality opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez limiting the Fourth Amendment's reach
to domestic searches lacked the support of a majority of the Court:
Thus, only four Justices stood behind the broad proposition that Chief Justice
Rehnquist advanced: that the Fourth Amendment terminates at the water's edge
for all except United States citizens and resident aliens. Seven Justices (all except
Brennan and Marshall) supported the far more limited proposition that the
Amendment's warrant clause is inapplicable to searches of noncitizens abroad.
Bentley, supra note 18, at 361.
Thus, even post-Verdugo-Urquidez, there remains support for the idea that extraterrito-
rial searches are subject to fewer constitutional restrictions than domestic ones.96See Guitterez I, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *17-18.
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The remaining defendant, the international student, would be in a middle
ground. Would her connections be more like those of the permanent resi-
dent or those of the undocumented immigrant? The indeterminacy of this
person's protection under the Fourth Amendment is troubling.
The trial court would be able most effectively to weigh the nonciti-
zens' Fourth Amendment claims by adjudicating them on their merits
rather than by hiding behind the doctrine of standing, a procedural smoke
screen parading as a legitimate constitutional device. Because all three of
the noncitizens' claims to the business property would involve similar
substantive issues, it would behoove the presiding court to take the mat-
ters concurrently, ruling on the merits of each argument and achieving
consistent outcomes. Proceeding in this way would ensure that law en-
forcement officers would not be tempted to engage in constitutional vio-
lations knowing that their undocumented immigrant targets, and possibly
their temporary nonimmigrant targets, would likely have no standing to
raise a Fourth Amendment claim.97
In sum, application of the Guitterez I/Barona significant voluntary
connections test to undocumented immigrants' domestic Fourth Amend-
ment claims could produce several unjust consequences. Although the
test would encourage compliance with the immigration laws, it would
create that incentive in the midst of a system that burdened some immi-
grants more than others, depending upon their countries of origin. In ad-
dition, creating distinctions in standing among noncitizens would dilute
the Fourth Amendment's deterrent effect on law enforcement, effectively
permitting the government selectively to target certain vulnerable un-
documented immigrants and temporary nonimmigrants for whom com-
pliance with the significant voluntary connections test might be difficult.
Part 11 of this Article explains why current immigration law doctrine
provides little relief to the aggrieved undocumented immigrant seeking to
assert a Fourth Amendment claim. Indeed, because of the Supreme
Court's long-standing belief in the plenary power of Congress over im-
migration law, current immigration doctrine would likely serve as a
shield to justify the Guitterez IlBarona significant voluntary connections
test rather than as a sword to dismantle it.
97 While Guitterez I, Barona, and Verdugo-Urquidez all raise the possibility of an un-
documented immigrant's fulfilling the "significant voluntary connections" test, the actual
application of the test in Guitterez I leaves little hope that a future trial court will count
one's unlawful presence or any relational ties to the U.S. during that period as sufficient to
trump the perception that a lawbreaker should not profit from her misdeeds. See Guillerez
1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *16-22; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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II. Why the Current Immigrants' Rights Law Would Support
the Guitterez IlBarona Approach:
The Tyranny of the Plenary Power Doctrine
Since the Chinese Exclusion Case,9s the Supreme Court has affirmed
time and again that the Congress has plenary power-virtually unbridled
discretion-to formulate immigration policy as it deems fit. In addition to
noting the Constitution's mandate that Congress create a uniform rule of
naturalization,99 the Court has located the legislature's power over non-
citizens in Congress's implicit foreign relations power.' ° While many
commentators have called for the abandonment of the plenary power
doctrine,10' the idea of Congress's unfettered command over immigration
policy has remained remarkably resilient.y°n
While the Court has applied a rational basis test to federal alienage
classifications outside of the strict immigration context,10 3 rarely has the
Court struck down any legislation on rational basis grounds, 1°4 opting
instead to defer to the law-making branches of government if "any plau-
sible reason" is proffered for the classification.105
Because the Supreme Court defers regularly to Congressional initia-
tives in the area of immigration and immigrants' rights, it is not surpris-
ing that the Court would also choose to favor the government over the
undocumented immigrant when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. 10 6 To
93 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
"00 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936).
101 See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7; Wu, supra note 7.
102 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 7, at 3 ("Classical immigration law proved to be re-
markably durable!'); Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 7.
103 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); see also Mendoza v. INS, 559 F Supp.
842 (W.D.Tex. 1982).
No evidence presented even suggested that the INS and EPPD formulated their
plan for the area control operation for the purpose of denying any Mexican-
American equal protection of the laws. Discriminatory intent must be shown to
recover for denial of equal protection. Discriminatory intent has not been shown;
therefore, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in the merits of their equal protec-
tion claim.
Id. at 850 (internal citations omitted).
104 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding Colorado state constitu-
tional Amendment Two invalid under rational basis test); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating city zoning ordinance under rational basis
test); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1984) (invalidating
Webster County tax system under rational basis test).
'05 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) ("Where there
are 'plausible reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end."') (internal citations
omitted).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (stating that
a noncitizen defendant must have significant voluntary connections with the United States
before she may avail herself of Fourth Amendment protection to challenge the search of
her overseas residences); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding
2000]
78 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
the extent that legal entry into the United States informs the Fourth
Amendment standing principle embodied in the significant voluntary
connections test, the Court's deferral to Congress's plenary power over
immigration supports and reinforces the membership paradigm implicit
in the significant voluntary connections test. Just as the Guitterez
IlBarona approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would draw a
boundary between persons based on whether or not they were lawfully
present within the United States, the plenary power doctrine grants Con-
gress the power to draw a similar line between citizens and noncitizens
when allocating certain public goods.
Hence, viewing the problem of undocumented immigrants' Fourth
Amendment rights through the plenary power prism is an exercise in
frustration for those opposed to the significant voluntary connections test.
It is not surprising that Guitterez I was decided as it was given that the
Supreme Court, in addition to sanctioning the ill-defined Verdugo-
Urquidez significant voluntary connections test, has embraced a view that
immigration law is less about immigrants' rights than it is about main-
taining congressional power. Put another way, both the significant vol-
untary connections test and the plenary power doctrine privilege mem-
bership connections to the United States polity over the inherent rights of
an individual, regardless of immigration status.
In an effort to escape the plenary power prison, Part III of this Arti-
cle offers an alternative to the current approach by examining changes in
traditional premises liability law that have emphasized the humanity of
all injured plaintiffs. As discussed below, several states have abandoned
the traditional landowner/entrant classification scheme for determining
premises liability, opting instead for a reasonableness approach that not
only comports with other areas of negligence law, but also correctly re-
establishes the presumption that all plaintiffs deserve protection from
unreasonable conduct. Immigration scholars might find this reasonable-
ness approach useful as a method of critiquing the significant voluntary
connections test because, like the traditional premises liability classifi-
cations, the significant voluntary connections test emphasizes the indi-
vidual's legal status in society rather than her inherent right to be pro-
tected from unreasonable conduct.
that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not exclude evidence used in civil
deportation hearings).
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III. A Tort Law Alternative to the Guitterez IlBarona Approach:
A Question of Reasonableness
A. The Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel
Just as immigration law and immigrants' fights law107 classify non-
citizens in order to determine what fights the U.S. government owes
them, traditional tort law assigns fights to land entrants against landown-
ers based on an entrant's status. In tort law, there are three general ap-
proaches to the question of landowner liability for harms suffered by per-
sons entering the owner's property.108 Most states follow the common law
tradition of examining the status of an entrant to determine landowner
liability ("Model 1"). In this model, a landowner would owe a duty of
reasonable care towards an invitee (someone permissibly on the property
for the landowner's benefit), 109 but would generally owe a lesser duty,
such as the duty not to act willfully or wantonly, to a licensee (someone
permissibly on the property for his or her own benefit)1 or a trespasser
(someone on the property without permission)."'
Some states, notably California"' and New York," 3 have abolished
this traditional scheme of entrant classification in favor of a reasonable
person standard. This standard assumes that all entrants have equal status
as persons, and that the foreseeability of harm to the entrant, rather than
the entrant's status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser, should determine
the landowner's liability ("Model 2").
A third group of states has chosen a middle ground by merging the
invitee and licensee classifications but retaining the separate trespasser
distinction ("Model 3"). These states see invitees and licensees as those
107 Immigration law refers to the law governing the admission and exclusion of non-
citizens; immigrants' rights law describes general laws that affect immigrants' rights while
they reside in the United States. For example, the law regarding which visa a noncitizen
must have to enter the United States is an immigration law concept, while the law requir-
ing that the noncitizen be entitled to a jury trial while in the United States is an immi-
grants' rights law idea. In previous writings, the author has used the terms immigration law
and alienage law to draw similar distinctions. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 427.
103 See Appendix infra for a survey of the governing premises liability law standards in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
109 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25 § 61, at 425 & n.89 (5th ed. 1984) ("The occu-
pier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable
care for their protection:')
"10 See id. § 60, at 412.
"I See id. § 58, at 393. See, e.g., Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.,
662 N.E.2d 287, 293 (Ohio 1996) (applying the willful or wanton standard to both licen-
sees and trespassers). Keeton et al., however, note that generally an entrant gains more
protection as her status improves from trespasser to licensee to invitee. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 25, § 58, at 393.
112 See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (partially superceded by statute
in two narrow and specific situations).
13 See Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y 1976); see also Scurti v. City of New
York, 354 N.E.2d 794 (N.Y. 1976).
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with permission to enter the premises, while trespassers have no permis-
sion. Accordingly, this third group of states requires a lesser duty of
landowners towards trespassers, but imposes a reasonable care standard
with respect to invitees and licensees. 114 Figure 1 below illustrates the
Model 1 and Model 3 classification schemes.
FIGURE 1: PREMISES LIABILITY UNDER CLASSIFICATION MODELS 1 & 3
Entrant Classification Entrant's Protection
Invitee Duty of Reasonable Care
Licensee Model 3-Duty of Reasonable Care
Model 1-Duty to Avoid Willful/Wanton Acts
Trespasser Duty to Avoid Willful/Wanton Acts
In the context of immigrants' rights law, a similar tripartite classi-
fication scheme characterizes the Guitterez IlBarona approach to allo-
cating Fourth Amendment rights to noncitizens. Under that approach,
undocumented immigrants would be required to establish significant vol-
untary connections to the United States prior to asserting Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Undocumented immigrants might never meet that burden,
since the Guitterez I court found none of the undocumented immigrant
defendants' proffered connections sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment
standing. ' ' The court even surmised that Guitterez' long-time domicile in
California showed the lack of a connection to the United States, since
during that time he had evaded detection by immigration officials."6 Such
a ruling implies that undocumented immigrants may never be able to use
their length of stay in the United States as a basis for meeting the
significant voluntary connections test. Indeed, if the Barona court's dicta
limiting the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to "the people" (to
citizens at home and abroad, and to legal permanent residents within the
United States) prevails, undocumented immigrants will likely never be
able to assert Fourth Amendment protections at all." 7 Then, undocu-
mented immigrants would be left with only Fifth Amendment substantive
due process protections against truly egregious searches-for example,
114 See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modem Status of Rules Conditioning Land-
owner's Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22
A.L.R. 4th 294 (1981).
"- See United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16646, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997).
16 1d
17 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting in part United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting)).
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confessions obtained through physical brutalityn 8 -without any Fourth
Amendment relief.
Taken together, Guitterez I and Barona, if followed, would effec-
tively deny Fourth Amendment protections to undocumented immigrants
based on their illegal status in the country. In addition, neither Guitterez I
nor Barona discussed the extent to which legal nonimmigrants would be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the matrix of Fourth
Amendment rights under the Guitterez I and Barona decisions would ap-
pear as set forth in Figure 2.
FIGuRE 2: THE GUITTERBZ IIBARONA TEST FOR
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Immigration Among "The People" Level of Protection from
Classification per the Fourth Illegal Searches
Amendment?
Legal Permanent Probably yes Fourth and Fifth
Resident Amendment protections
apply
Legal Nonimmi- Unclear Unclear whether Fourth
grant Amendment applies;
Fifth Amendment pro-
tection applies
Undocumented Probably no No Fourth Amendment
Immigrant protection; Fifth
Amendment protection
applies
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, one notices certain similarities between
the two regimes-tort law Models 1 and 3 on one hand, and the Guitterez
IlBarona Fourth Amendment regime on the other. In both regimes, the
protective rights granted to the different classified groups vary depending
on each group's legal relationship to the landowner (in tort law) or to the
United States (in immigration and immigrants' rights law). Specifically,
the landowner's level of care falls from that of reasonable care to simply
avoiding willful and wanton acts as the entrant's classification changes
from invitee to licensee to trespasser. Similarly, under the Guitterez
IlBarona model, the noncitizen's Fourth Amendment rights would di-
I" The Fourteenth Amendment analogue to Fifth Amendment due process protections
includes the right to be free from beatings by government agents for the purpose of coerc-
ing confessions out of criminal defendants. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-
86 (1936).
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minish and reliance upon the Fifth Amendment's substantive due process
protections would increase as the immigrant's status changed from legal
permanent resident to legal nonimmigrant to undocumented immigrant.
Indeed, the parallels between the two classification systems are
striking: the landowner in tort law is analogous to the U.S. government in
immigration and immigrants' rights law; the invitee to the legal perma-
nent resident; the licensee to the legal nonimmigrant;119 and the trespasser
to the undocumented immigrant. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figures 1
and 2 above, just as the tort law places a greater burden on the trespasser
than on the invitee with respect to any claims each may have against the
landowner, immigration and immigrants' rights law likewise confers
fewer benefits and protections on the undocumented immigrant than on
the legal permanent resident. Figure 3 illustrates this analogy between
the two systems.
FIGURE 3: THE TORT LAW/IMMIGRATION LAW PARALLEL
Tort Law: Premises Liability Immigration & Immigrants'Rights Law
Landowner U.S. Government
Invitee Legal Permanent Resident
Licensee Legal Nonimmigrant
Trespasser Undocumented Immigrant
The utility of this analogy between tort law and immigration and
immigrants' rights law extends beyond the parallelism outlined in Figures
1 to 3. Immigration scholars might look to the unitary reasonableness
standard in premises liability law-in contrast to traditional land-
owner/entrant classification schemes-to rethink how they might recon-
struct and reinforce the floor of immigrants' Fourth Amendment rights.
Part III.B explores that argument in depth by examining the holding in
Rowland v. Christian, the landmark case in which the California Supreme
Court abandoned the traditional entrant classification scheme in favor of
a reasonableness approach to premises liability.120
119 While the distinction between the invitee and licensee can sometimes be a tenuous
one, much of the distinction turns on whether the landowner benefits from the entry-that
is, licensees confer no benefit to the landowner and are on the land solely for their own
purposes, while invitees confer a benefit to the landowner. See DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T.
HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 307-08 nn.2(a) & 3 (3d ed. 1997).
From this benefits analysis, the legal permanent resident (like the invitee) confers
long-term benefits upon the United States through her labor and purchasing power, while
the legal nonimmigrant (like the licensee) benefits largely herself, conferring only inci-
dental benefits to the United States during her temporary visit.
120 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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B. Lessons for the Immigration Scholar from Rowland v. Christian
In Rowland v. Christian,121 the California Supreme Court was pre-
sented with an ideal set of facts to enable it to depart from the traditional
entrant classification scheme in favor of a unitary reasonableness stan-
dard. A social guest of Nancy Christian, James Rowland, was injured by
a defective faucet in Christian's bathroom.'2 Specifically, nerves and ten-
dons in Rowland's right hand were severed. During Rowland's personal
injury action against her, Christian moved for summary judgment, al-
though she acknowledged that she had known of the defective faucet and
had reported it to her landlord."n The trial court granted Christian's mo-
tion, holding that because Rowland was a social guest (and, therefore, a
licensee), Christian owed him the duty to refrain only from wanton or
willful conduct.1 2 4 Had the applicable standard been one of reasonable
care, the trial court probably would have left the determination of liabil-
ity to the jury, who could have found that Christian owed a duty to in-
form Rowland of the defective faucet, which she had not done.'2
5
On appeal, the California Supreme Court saw through the rigidity of
the traditional classification system and rejected its approach. 126 While
ruling that entrant status is relevant to determining landowner liability,
the court rejected the notion that such status should be outcome determi-
native. 27 Instead, the court stated that the plaintiff's status as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee was but one factor in the assessment of whether the
landowner defendant had acted reasonably under the circumstances./1s
The high court described the traditional tort classification system as con-
trary to California negligence law, which utilizes a standard of ordinary
care. 29 In addition, the court noted that the historical bases for favoring
the old classifications had become less persuasive over time, as evi-
denced by the growing number of exceptions created to accommodate
unusual fact scenarios.3 0 For example, courts had imposed a duty of due
care towards licensees for "active operations" on the defendant's land as
an exception to the general willful and wanton rule.13 1 Indeed, the
121 See id.
122 See id. at 562.
'2 See id.
124 See id. at 562-63.
2 See id. at 563. Indeed, the court acknowledged that the ordinary negligence rule
adopted in California is that "'[a]ll persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent
others being injured as a result of their conduct."' Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted).
1 6 See id. at 568.
127 See id.
18 See id.
129 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(a) ("Every one is responsible, not only for the result of
his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his property or person.").
M See Rowland, 443 P.2d at 561, 568.
131 Id. at 565 (citing Oettinger v. Stewart, 148 P.2d 19, 22 (Cal. 1944)).
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inflexible nature of the traditional classification system prompted the
United States Supreme Court to describe the classes and their exceptions
as a "semantic morass" in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale. 1 2
In addition to highlighting the classification system's departure from
ordinary negligence law and its growing irrelevance and rigidity in mod-
em society, the Rowland court also noted that the traditional classifications
drew what appeared to be arbitrary distinctions between persons of equal
worth for purposes of limiting landowner responsibility in tort.'33 As the
court so eloquently stated, "A man's life or limb does not become less
worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation
under the law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission [i.e., a trespasser] or with permission but without a business
purpose [i.e., a licensee]?' 134 Thus, under Rowland, a plaintiff's recovery
is based upon the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, rather than
upon the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Put another
way, the Rowland court primarily assigned liability based on the conduct
involved, not on the plaintiff's legal status.
Following Rowland, several jurisdictions have also abandoned the
traditional entrant classification scheme.'35 The relevant premises liability
decisions from such jurisdictions serve as useful case studies for immi-
gration scholars seeking new ways to structure immigration policy so that
it strikes a fair balance between polity membership and personhood.
Specifically, Part Ill.C examines how observations gleaned from the
Rowland opinion can serve to critique the Guitterez IBarona approach to
Fourth Amendment rights.
C. Applying the Rowland Solution to the Guitterez J/Barona Problem:
Emphasizing the Value of Personhood
In Rowland, the California Supreme Court emphasized three princi-
ples in justifying its dismantling of the traditional entrant classifications:
(1) that the traditional scheme was a departure from state negligence law;
132 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959).
1 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567-68.
3 4d. at 568.
135See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 873 (N.Y. 1976); Scurti v. New York,
354 N.E.2d 794, 798 (N.Y. 1976). In Basso, the New York Court of Appeals followed Cali-
fornia's lead by abolishing the traditional land entrant classifications in favor of a unitary
due care standard. Basso, 352 N.E.2d at 872. Scurti, which was decided the same day as
Basso, added to the analysis by specifying that the traditional classes would be relevant to,
but not determinative of, landowner liability. Scurti, 354 N.E.2d at 798. In assessing the
reasonableness of a landowner's conduct, the court specifically listed three factors that
would carry continued significance: (1) whether the injury occurred on the defendant's
property; (2) whether the plaintiff entered the land with the defendant's permission; and
(3) the age of the plaintiff. Id. at 796-99. Thus, in abolishing the traditional system, the
New York court simply incorporated the entrant's status as a factor in assessing reason-
ableness.
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(2) that the historical bases for the entrant classes had to be modified in
order to adapt to modem conditions; and (3) that the common law classi-
fications drew arbitrary distinctions among humans whose lives are of
equal worth.1 36
These lessons have parallels in the critique of the Guitterez IlBarona
approach to the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants.
First, just as the traditional entrant classifications depart from general
negligence law, the significant voluntary connections test departs from
traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As discussed earlier, tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment cases focus on the reasonableness of the gov-
ernment's actions, while the significant voluntary connections test fo-
cuses on a defendant's status to determine standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim; while the traditional approach is consistent with the
Amendment's purpose of deterring government misconduct, the significant
voluntary connections test shifts the focus to the entitlement of individual
defendants to protection. In addition, the deprivation of a noncitizen's
constitutional rights based on her immigration status is inconsistent with
much of the Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence. 37 In Plyler v. Doe,
for example, the Court held that children of undocumented immigrants
were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1 38
Moreover, the Court has found that the Fifth and First Amendment pro-
tections conferred upon citizens apply to noncitizens as well.1 39
Second, just as tort law must adapt to changing conditions, Fourth
Amendment law must do the same. The Guitterez IlBarona approach is
derived from Chief Justice Rehnquist's textual analysis of the Fourth
Amendment in Verdugo-Urquidez, which led him to conclude that the
Fourth Amendment applies to a more limited group than the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Rehnquist also contended that limitations
on the conferral of rights are appropriate because, even in the First and
Fifth Amendment cases granting constitutional protection to noncitizens,
the noncitizens in question were legal permanent residents, and therefore
had significant voluntary connections with the United States.1" While
this textual and historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment is a starting
point for determining the Amendment's scope, it should not be the end
point. Indeed, in articulating the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court originally stressed the preservation of judicial integrity as a main
goal of the exclusionary rule, the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment
136Rowland, 443 P.2d at 566-67; see also text accompanying notes 131-133.137 See cases cited supra note 23.
138 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects legal permanent residents).
139 See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (holding that a legal perma-
nent resident is a "person" within the context of the Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945) (holding that legal permanent residents have First Amendment rights).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 44-59. See also United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1960).
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violations.14 Over time, however, the goal of deterring unreasonable gov-
ernment action gained popularity and became the primary rationale for
the exclusionary rule."
The Court should ask itself whether apportioning Fourth Amend-
ment rights on the basis of citizenship or significant voluntary connec-
tions is consistent with modern trends in immigration policy. An exami-
nation of such modern trends suggests that it is not. Over time, immigra-
tion law has begun to tear down barriers between citizens and nonciti-
zens. In state alienage jurisprudence, for example, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny analysis to states' discrimination against noncitizens in the
distribution of public benefits. 43 Even within the federal alienage cases,
the Court has held Congress to a rational basis standard for legislation
that discriminates between noncitizen groups in Medicare disburse-
ments.144 Furthermore, these cases involving greater scrutiny of govern-
ment action considered only the distribution of public economic benefits,
not the conferral of a constitutional right. If, despite the resilience of the
plenary power doctrine, the Court is willing to scrutinize government
action closely with respect to the conferral of public benefits, it should be
willing to subject government searches and seizures to even closer ex-
amination whether or not the target of such action is a citizen. Surely,
one's interest in personal liberty outweighs the economic interest in gov-
ernment support.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Guitterez IlBarona
significant voluntary connections test draws arbitrary distinctions be-
tween people in much the same way that the traditional tort entrant
classes do. 145 If the modern goal of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
to deter the government from unreasonably invading individual privacy,146
then it should not matter whose privacy-the citizen's or the nonciti-
zen's-is being invaded. 17 Just as the injured tort plaintiff should not be
arbitrarily denied recovery depending on her land entrant status, the con-
stitutional grievance suffered by the criminal defendant is just as serious
whether or not that defendant is a citizen.
'41 The Court believed that allowing tainted evidence to be used at trial would amount
to condoning a constitutional violation and would, therefore, compromise the trial's integ-
rity. See infra notes 156-157.
142See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66.
143See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
144See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
145See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566-67 (Cal. 1968); see also supra Part
llI.A.
146 See infra note 156.
147 Current equal protection doctrine requires that injured plaintiffs show an intent to
discriminate prior to allowing a remedy. However, those injured by constitutional viola-
tions rarely care whether the perpetrator intended harm; they simply want recompense. For
example, polls reveal that many African Americans see racism as a pervasive, institutional
condition in modem America, whether intended or not. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 593 (3d ed. 1998).
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Thus, just as the Rowland court incorporated the traditional entrant
classifications into its due care approach, courts should bypass the
standing requirement imposed upon noncitizens by the significant vol-
untary connections test in favor of adjudicating the merits of Fourth
Amendment claims. This unitary approach to Fourth Amendment rights
would avoid the problem of the slippery slope. Rather than trying to dis-
cern whether a defendant has standing under the significant voluntary
connections test ex ante, trial courts would address each search and sei-
zure on its merits, balancing the defendant's right to privacy against the
government's need to secure evidence for the prosecution of a case.
A unitary approach that grants Fourth Amendment protection to all
noncitizens would also be prudent foreign policy. As Justice Brennan
suggested in his Verdugo-Urquidez dissent, subjecting noncitizen defen-
dants to U.S. criminal sanctions should create an obligation upon the
courts to accord such defendants corresponding protections of U.S.
criminal procedural law.148 This "mutuality" 14 9 of obligation would en-
gender trust among the world's nations and would signal the United
States' commitment to due process for foreigners subject to its law. In
addition, affording noncitizen defendants the protection of American
constitutional law would be consistent with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provides similar protections against unlawful
searches and whose provisions the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked on at
least one occasion. 50
In addition to recognizing the three principles emphasized in Row-
land, a presumption of standing to assert Fourth Amendment claims
would break down existing race-based stereotypes of the undocumented
immigrant as the "other,' such as the unfortunate but pervasive image of
the dark-skinned "illegal alien" from Mexico'5' who crosses the border
with his pregnant wife to live off welfare and to avail himself of the
birthright citizenship of his child after her arrival in this world. 52 Ac-
14 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284-85 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 107-17 (discussing Brennan's opinion
and the concept of "mutuality").149 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1-0In American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 549
n.5 (1948), Justice Frankfurter invoked Article 20(2) of the Universal Declaration in his
concurrence supporting the Court's decision to uphold a state law designed to protect non-
union members. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration provides that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to protection of the law
against such interference or attacks." G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 12 (1948)
at 71.
151 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immi-
gration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1545-46 (1995)
(describing the stereotypical "illegal alien" as being perceived to be a Mexican male).
152 This pervasive negative image of the parents conferring birthright citizenship upon
their unborn child by illegally entering the United States led to the introduction of a House
bill calling for a constitutional amendment to restrict birthright citizenship to children of
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knowledging that the Fourth Amendment should deter all governmental
overreaching regardless of the citizenship of the accused would help to
bridge the gap between the presumptively white or black American and
the presumptively brown or yellow "alien:"'53 Put another way, presuming
Fourth Amendment standing for all persons regardless of citizenship would
be another step towards recognizing the personhood of citizens and non-
citizens alike. To the extent that race and alienage stereotypes intersect,
breaking down the citizen/noncitizen barrier likewise dismantles the
majority/minority racial divide. For example, subjecting law enforcement
officers to a single Fourth Amendment standard regardless of the target's
citizenship would assure that officers inclined to harass minority citizens
with "foreign" appearances or "foreign-sounding names '154 would be
fully deterred.
Some may contend that the tort law/immigration law parallel would
be most useful as a hypothetical construct or intellectual exercise, since
the goals of private tort law differ substantially from those of constitu-
tional law and immigration policy. Specifically, tort law is premised on
the notion of reasonable compensation for injured plaintiffs, while public
constitutional law is about the preservation of individual rights. However,
both types of law seek to deter undesirable conduct. In tort law, one of
the chief objectives of the negligence standard is to achieve the optimal
level of accidents in society by assigning liability to deter unreasonable
conduct.'55 Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme
documented noncitizens. See H.R.J. Res. 117, 103d Cong. (1993). See also NEUMAN, Sit-
pra note 18, at 165-87; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitu-
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 54 (1997).
153 See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1098
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1982) (noting that, unlike blacks or whites, Asians are presumed to
be foreigners). As the United States becomes more racially diverse, the concern about
identifying likely undocumented immigrants may seem to be waning. However, following
the passage of Proposition 187 in November 1994, people across California appointed
themselves "immigration police" and reported many Latinos to the INS because they alleg-
edly fit the profile of an undocumented immigrant. See, e.g., Demetria Martinez, Hatred
Rumbles Along New Fault Line Called Proposition 187, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Feb. 10,
1995, at 18 (recounting incidences of harassment of Latino Americans in the wake of
Proposition 187).
ImSee, e.g., Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that arrest of
noncitizen based solely on his foreign sounding name was an egregious violation of the
Fourth Amendment); see also Joseph J. Migas, Exclusionary Rule Available in Civil De-
portation Proceedings for Egregious Fourth Amendment Violations, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J.
207 (1995) (analyzing the Orhorhaghe case).
15- Judge Richard Posner asserts, and many would agree, that the foundation of tort law
lies in the theory of negligence as defined by the standard of ordinary care. Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 15 (Robert L. Rabin ed.,
1995). The rules of negligence reflect cost/benefit assessments by society. Judge Learned
Hand, for example, formulated a simple algebraic test to determine the proper balance of
costs and benefits. In a negligence case, three things should be measured: the magnitude of
the loss; the probability of the accident occurring; and the burden of taking precautions
that would avert that accident. See id. at 18.
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Court has recognized the deterrence of unreasonable governmental con-
duct as an aim of both the exclusionary rule156 and the threat of Bivens
suits. 57 Moreover, in both the Rowland approach to tort liability and the
Guitterez I decision to rule on the merits of the Fourth Amendment
claim, the courts relied on reasonableness standards-due care in Row-
land and a reasonable search in Guitterez I 5 -- to strike the proper bal-
ance between the parties' legitimate interests.
156 The exclusionary rule prohibits the fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure
from admission into evidence in a criminal case. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, at 1.1(a); see
also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 388 (1914) (creating the exclusionary rule).
The primary purpose of the rule has evolved from preserving judicial integrity to de-
terring illegal conduct of law enforcement officials. See 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR.,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4:6 (2d ed. 1991). Early application of the exclusionary rule fo-
cused on limiting the perceived legitimation of unconstitutional conduct by courts. See id.
(citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383). If evidence seized in violation of constitutional guaran-
tees were to be admitted, the trial court's acceptance of such evidence "would be to affirm
by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution[.]" HALL, supra, § 4:7 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394). However, over time,
this early concern with judicial integrity gave way to the deterrence of unreasonable
searches and seizures as the dominant purpose of the exclusionary rule. See LAFAvE, supra
note 22, at 1.1(f). As the court stated in Elkins v. United States, "[t]he rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it:'
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). The objective of the exclusionary rule is not to compensate the
defendant or to penalize the offending officer; instead, the "emphasis is forward." Id.
One might argue that the deterrence rationale is not persuasive in the great majority of
cases involving immigrants because the exclusionary rule has been held by the Supreme
Court to not apply in deportation hearings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1980). However, this Article is most concerned with the applicability of the rule in crimi-
nal law contexts given the Court's own statements in Lopez-Mendoza distinguishing be-
tween civil deportation hearings and criminal proceedings. See id. at 1040-41.
157 Because the exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally
guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to
forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal," LAFAVE, supra
note 22, § 1.2(b) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), Fourth Amendment guaran-
tees are also enforced through suits for money damages under the Bivens rule. In Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court held
that damages may be sought against specific federal agents for violations of the Fourth
Amendment. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). This system of monetary compensation differs
from the exclusionary rule in at least two ways: it specifically deters individual federal
agents rather than creating an evidentiary check that would not be useful should the
authorities decide not to prosecute, and it provides direct compensation to the victim rather
than a systemic, institutional remedy. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 1.2(b),(c).
158 The phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" creates a reasonableness standard
with which law enforcement officers must comply. If the search or seizure is unreasonable,
the exclusionary rule may bar such evidence. Indeed, the current reasonableness analysis
had its genesis in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the Court stated that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places:' Hon. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Intro-
duction to WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 2 (1995). To
emphasize this point, Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence created a reasonable expectation
of privacy standard for defendants asserting their Fourth Amendment freedom. Instead of
focusing on whether the defendant enjoys Fourth Amendment protection, the question
became whether the defendant possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 3.
Thus, Harlan's contribution changed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment right from
a rigid all-or-nothing standard to a more flexible measure of evaluation based on the defen-
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Even assuming the validity of the tort law/immigration law parallel,
others may argue that doing away with the Fourth Amendment standing
requirement would open the floodgates to nonmeritorious defenses. To
the contrary, defense counsel presumably would not raise spurious Fourth
Amendment claims if they believed that they could not win on the mer-
its.159 Furthermore, in the event of an unlikely increase in frivolous
claims, the value of protecting constitutional rights might be worth the
sacrifice of some judicial resources in order to ensure that justice is
served.160
Some may submit that the unitary approach to Fourth Amendment
law would be "soft" on crime and on undocumented immigration. If the
rule of law is meant to encourage law abidance, creating a presumption
of standing for all undocumented immigrants would, in one sense, reward
illicit activity. Why should immigrants who enter the country illegally
and then stand charged with a crime benefit from their actions by being
able to challenge searches that would not have taken place but for their
illegal activity and illegal presence in the United States?16' This argument
fails for two reasons. First, all criminal defendants are entitled to consti-
tutional criminal procedural protections, such as the right to a fair and
impartial jury trial, 162 yet such safeguards do not solely protect crimi-
nals.163 Rather, these rights ensure that all who stand accused are given
dant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Today, courts evaluate defendants' Fourth
Amendment claims based on the totality of the circumstances, using reasonableness as a
guide. See id.
1.9 For example, federal district courts have the power to sanction wayward attorneys
through criminal contempt proceedings. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 42 (rule governing criminal
contempt proceedings); 18 U.S.C.A. § 402 (1998) (statute regarding contempts that con-
stitute crimes).
,60 The Supreme Court has noted that
the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may char-
acterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than me-
diocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
161 This was likely the argument underlying the Guitterez I court's thinking. Recent
immigration law reforms also support this predisposition against criminal noncitizens. For
example, the 1996 amendments to the INA added several crime-related grounds for de-
porting noncitizens. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, § 440(g)(1)(A)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (c) (1996)); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009,
§ 306(d) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1231 (1996)); INA, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978,
§ 238(a)(1) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1101 (1990)).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e believe
the literal language of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments supports a reading that the right
to a jury trial in every criminal prosecution is absolute... "').
163 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEo. L.J. 641,
643 (1996) ("[T]he fair trial right also protects the innocent man from an erroneous verdict
of guilt... "').
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more protection than the empty phrase "presumption of innocence"
would otherwise provide. 164 Second, as mentioned earlier, a noncitizen's
immigration legal or illegal status is based on factors that favor nonciti-
zens from certain countries over others.165 It is unpersuasive to impugn
someone's moral worth when she might not have been adjudged "illegal"
had she arrived from Canada.16
A final argument that one might raise against a unitary approach to
the Fourth Amendment is that even within tort law, most jurisdictions
have retained the traditional entrant classification system or, at the very
least, have retained the category of trespasser, the analogue to the un-
documented immigrant in the Fourth Amendment context. 167 This sug-
gests that most courts would be unreceptive to an argument for a unitary
Fourth Amendment approach that relies on the tort law/immigration law
parallel because most states have chosen not to follow the Rowland ap-
proach advocated here. While this may be a practical hurdle, it is not an
insurmountable one. The challenge is to persuade courts of the merits of
the unitary approach. Specifically, a persuasive case can be made by em-
phasizing that the conferral of Fourth Amendment standing upon all non-
citizens serves the multiple goals of effective government deterrence,
equal treatment for all defendants regardless of citizenship, the estab-
lishment of a practical rule of reasonableness, and the dismantling of
negative stereotypes of undocumented immigrants.
Conclusion
Immigration scholars can learn much from tort law in trying to
reframe the debate on the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented
immigrants in domestic search cases. The tort law/immigration law par-
allel helps immigration advocates to construct a Fourth Amendment floor
under which no government conduct may fall.168 By following the rule of
I"4 See, e.g., Norfolk v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (noting that due process rights
are guaranteed by primary reliance upon the adversary system and presumption of inno-
cence); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (describing the importance at-
tached to the criminal law's presumption of innocence).
16' See supra text accompanying note 86.
,66 See supra text accompanying note 86.
'
67 See Appendix infra. Twenty-eight states continue to follow the tripartite Model 1
(trespasser, licensee, invitee) classification scheme. Nineteen states considered but rejected
arguments to switch to a Model 2 (due care standard) or Model 3 (trespasser/invitee or
licensee) system; however, 9 of the 28 Model 1 states have yet to consider the change.
Nine states have abolished traditional entrant classifications and fall under Model 2. Thir-
teen states and the District of Columbia have adopted Model 3.
"s While discussion here has been limited to the Fourth Amendment, Kevin Johnson
suggests that the tort law/immigration law parallel might extend to a discussion of other
constitutional (e.g., the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees) and
statutory (e.g., the federal minimum wage laws and labor standards) rights of noncitizens.
See E-mail from Kevin Johnson, Professor, Univ. Cal.-Davis School of Law (Mar. 16,
1999, on file with the author).
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reasonableness exemplified by Rowland v. Christian, immigration law-
yers can begin to articulate a unitary standard for Fourth Amendment
claims that assumes standing for all criminal defendants, regardless of
citizenship. Such an approach reinforces the idea of equal personhood
and tempers the role that citizenship plays in a society that is, after all,
populated largely by immigrants.
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Appendix: Premises Liability Laws
Introduction
This appendix contains a survey of the premises liability laws in the
fifty states and the District of Columbia. Twenty-eight states continue to
follow the tripartite Model 1 (trespasser, licensee, invitee) classification
scheme. Nine states have abolished traditional entrant classifications and
adopted the Model 2 (unitary due care) standard. Thirteen states and the
District of Columbia have adopted Model 3 (trespasser versus invitee and
licensee).
Leading Case or Statute Description
Alabama
McMullan v. Butler, 346 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1977)
The common law distinctions for entrants (trespasser, licensee, and
invitee) continue to be viable under Alabama law.
Alaska
Webb v. City of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977)
A landowner must maintain her property in a reasonably safe condi-
tion in view of all the circumstances.
Arizona
Robles v. Severyn, 504 P.2d 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973)
The rule set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court in Shannon v. But-
ler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990 (1967), finding that a landowner's duty to a
person on her property is determined by the person's status, is extended
in an express rejection of Rowland's rationale.
Arkansas
Baldwin v. Mosley, 748 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1988)
The suggestion to discard legal distinctions between licensees and
invitees is rejected. The conventional entrant classification rules continue
to apply.
California
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)
A possessor of land must act reasonably in view of the probability of
injury to others. Although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee may have some bearing on the question of liability, such status
is not determinative.
Two California statutes partially supercede Rowland in specific
situations. Tort victims injured on trains are denied recovery from the
20001
94 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
railroad if they had no authority to be on board. Tort victims who are in-
jured while committing one of a specified number of felonies are also
denied recovery.
Colorado
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-115 (West 1998)
A trespasser may recover only for damages willfully or deliberately
caused by the landowner. A licensee may recover for a landowner's un-
reasonable failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to dangers of
which the landowner actually knew. An invitee may recover for an unrea-
sonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers of
which the landowner knew or should have known.
Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(a) (West 1998)
The common law distinctions between licensees and invitees are ab-
rogated. The standard of care owed to a social guest (licensee) is the
same standard of care owed to a business invitee.
Delaware
Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979)
Because eliminating common law classifications would be imper-
missible judicial legislation, the proposed abandonment of liability dis-
tinctions among an invitee, licensee, and trespasser is rejected.
District of Columbia
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurants Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
A landowner must maintain her property in a reasonably safe condi-
tion in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to
others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.
Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 551 A.2d 76 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988)
Smith is limited to its facts. The trespasser classification is pre-
served, but the licensee and invitee categories are eliminated.
Florida
Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1973)
The class of invitees entitled to reasonable care is expanded to in-
clude those who are "licensees by invitation" of the property owner, ei-
ther by express or reasonably implied invitation. However, this does not
extend to uninvited licensees.
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 to -2 (1997)
An ordinary care standard is established for invitees, and a willful
and wanton standard is established for licensees and trespassers.
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Hawaii
Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969)
An occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care for the safety
of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises, regardless
of the legal status of the individual.
Idaho
Mooney v. Robinson, 471 P.2d 63 (Idaho 1970)
With respect to social guests, the distinctions between duty owed li-
censees and that owed invitees by an owner or occupier of land are pre-
served.
Illinois
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/2 (West 1996)
The common law distinction between invitees and licensees is abol-
ished. The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the
circumstances, with regard to the state of the premises or acts done or
omitted on them.
Indiana
Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991)
A landowner owes trespassers and licensees the duty to refrain from
willful or wanton conduct. A landowner owes invitees the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care.
Iowa
Wiesleler v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa
1995)
Under Iowa premises liability law, the scope of the duty of care that
a possessor owes to an entrant is based on the entrant's legal status as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
Kansas
Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994)
The duty owed by an occupier of land to invitees and licensees is
one of reasonable care under all of the circumstances. The owner owes a
trespasser only the duty to refrain from willfully, wantonly, or recklessly
injuring her.
Kentucky
Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1988)
The traditional entrant classifications create the different duties
owed to trespassers, licensees, and invitees, and there is nothing unfair in
requiring violation of a duty before liability can be imposed. The dis-
tinctions among trespassers, licensees, and invitees are preserved.
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Louisiana
Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So.2d 367 (La. 1976)
Although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
may have some bearing on the question of reasonableness, the status is
not determinative. Rowlands v. Christian's approach is accepted by Lou-
siana.
Maine
Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979)
The owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable
care in all circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land. However,
abandonment of the trespasser distinction would place an unfair burden
on a landowner who has no reason to expect a trespasser's presence.
Maryland
Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 428 A.2d 459 (Md. 1981)
The common law distinctions between the duties owed to the various
classes of users of another's property are preferable to applying a general
negligence standard to all.
Massachusetts
Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973)
The former common law classifications of licensee and invitee are
governed by a common duty of reasonable care that the occupier owes to
all lawful visitors. The duty to avoid only willful or wanton injury to
trespassers is retained.
Michigan
Stanley v. Town Square Coop., 512 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993)
The common law duty of a landowner to one who comes upon his
land turns upon the status of the visitor as an invitee, licensee or tres-
passer.
Minnesota
Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972)
An entrant's status as a licensee or invitee is no longer controlling,
but is one element among many to be considered in determining the
landowner's liability under ordinary standards of negligence. Therefore,
reasonable care for the safety of all such persons invited upon the prem-
ises must be exercised, regardless of the status of the individual.
Mississippi
Astleford v. Milner Enters., Inc. 233 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1970)
The well-established distinctions for persons on property of another
and the duty the possessor of the premises owes to such persons are
maintained.
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Missouri
Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1995)
The licensee/invitee distinction and the traditional common law
classifications are retained, while a duty of reasonable care in all circum-
stances is rejected.
Montana
Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985)
The test in premises liability is not the status of the injured party but
the exercise of ordinary care by the landowner under the circumstances.
Nebraska
Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996)
Landowners have only the duty to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors. A
separate classification for trespassers is retained because one should not
owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to those not lawfully on one's
property.
Nevada
Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994)
Following Rowland v. Christian, all persons have an obligation to act
reasonably; an owner or occupier of land is held to the general duty of
reasonable care when another is injured on her land.
New Hampshire
Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976)
Owners and occupiers of land shall be governed by the test of rea-
sonable care, considering all of the circumstances, in the maintenance
and operation of their property.
New Jersey
Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co., 369 A.2d 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977)
The historical distinctions among the invitee, licensee, and tres-
passer are maintained, and a single rule of reasonable care is rejected.
New Mexico
Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 879 P.2d 766 (N.M. 1994)
A landowner or occupier of premises must act as a reasonable person
in maintaining her property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all
the circumstances. This duty of care extends to all persons other than
trespassers who enter the property with the express or implied consent of
the landowner.
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New York
Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y 1976)
Landowners are held to a single standard of reasonable care under
the circumstances whereby foreseeability is a measure of liability.
North Carolina
Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 107 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. 1959)
The landowner owes the invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and owes trespassers a
duty not to injure them willfully or wantonly.
North Dakota
O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977)
As to licensees and invitees, an occupier of premises must maintain
her property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circum-
stances. An occupier owes a trespasser only a duty to refrain from willful
or wanton harm.
Ohio
DiGildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio 1969)
Distinctions based upon an entrant's status are maintained, and a
rule of ordinary care under all the circumstances is not adopted as the
measure of a landowner's duty.
Oklahoma
Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274 (Okla. 1990)
There is no support for departing from common law principles gov-
erning the duty owed by a landowner to one upon her property without
express or implied permission.
Oregon
Sargent v. Inger, 548 P.2d 1303 (Or. 1976)
The traditional common law distinctions between the duty owed li-
censees and invitees are maintained; the trespasser classification is not
considered and is therefore implicitly retained.
Pennsylvania
Crotty v. Reading Indus., Inc., 345 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)
The duty of a possessor of land toward a third person entering the
land is measured by the status of the entrant at the time of the accident
(whether invitee, licensee, or trespasser).
Rhode Island
Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 333 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1975)
The common law status of an entrant onto the land of another is not
determinative of the degree of care owed by the owner. Instead, the ques-
tion is whether the owner has used reasonable care for the safety of all
persons reasonably expected to be upon the premises.
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South Carolina
Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 452
S.E.2d 619 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994)
A landowner's duty to maintain her land in certain conditions de-
pends upon the entrant's status as trespasser, licensee, invitee, or child.
South Dakota
Hofer v. Meyer, 295 N.W.2d 333 (S.D. 1980)
Common law classifications are retained; however, a special concur-
ring opinion suggests rejection of common law land entrant
classifications, and proposes a single standard of ordinary care to govern
all land entrants.
Tennessee
Hudson v. Gaitan 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984)
The duty owed to the former common law classifications of invitee
and licensee is one of reasonable care under all of the attendant circum-
stances. The trespassers are still owed only a duty to avoid willful and
wanton harm.
Texas
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985)
Common law standards for landowner liability are retained; how-
ever, a concurring opinion argues for wholesale abolition of land entrant
status.
Utah
Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979)
A person's status when injured is controlling on the question of li-
ability. The duty owed by a property owner to one who is injured on his
property depends on whether that person is an invitee, licensee or tres-
passer.
Vermont
Cameron v. Abatiell, 241 A.2d 310 (Vt. 1968)
Persons entering upon the land of another are generally divided into
the classes of trespasser, licensee, and invitee.
Virginia
Tate v. Rice, 315 S.E.2d 385 (Va. 1984)
The well-understood structure that has long regulated the duties
owed by landowners to their visitors is retained.
Washington
Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991 (Wash. 1986)
The use of common law classifications of invitee, licensee, and tres-
passer to determine the duty of care owed by an owner or occupier of
20001
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land is expressly reaffirmed; a unitary standard of reasonable care is re-
jected.
West Virginia
Self v. Queen, 487 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1997)
Long-established common law rules defining the duty the owner of
premises owes to persons upon those premises are retained, along with
distinctions among invitees, licensees, and trespassers.
Wisconsin
Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975)
The duty toward all persons who come upon property with the con-
sent of the occupier is that of ordinary care.
Wyoming
Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993)
The basis of liability is the foreseeability of the injury, rather than
the status of the lawful entrant. Therefore, trespassers are treated as a
distinct group, but the rule of reasonable care under the circumstances is
applied to all others.
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FIGURE 4: PREMISES LIABILITY LAWS BY MODEL AND JURISDICTION
Model 1
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado*
Delaware
Georgia*
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
New Jersey
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Model 2
Alaska
California
Hawaii
Louisiana
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New York
Rhode Island
* = statutorily imposed
Model 3
Connecticut*
District of Columbia
Florida
Illinois*
Kansas
Massachusetts
Maine
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Mexico
North Dakota
Tennessee
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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